CRM Scenario Questions in Pilot Interviews

A CRM scenario question describes a flight deck situation and asks what the candidate would do: "You are the first officer. On final, your captain is 20 kt fast and above the profile at 1,500 ft and says he will make it. What do you do?" It tests the same non-technical skills as the rest of selection, from assertiveness and decision making to threat and error management, but through a plan for the future rather than evidence from the past.

Scenario questions turn up in several places: in the HR or competency interview, in the technical interview as operational scenarios, and in group exercises. Among US airlines, for example, candidates report a CRM scenario worked as a group at Alaska and a scenario interview with one or two pilots at Southwest (see pilot interviews at US airlines). The answers that score well share a structure, and they rest on a small number of rules that every candidate should be able to quote.

Scenario versus competency questions

A competency question, also called a behavioral question, asks for a real past event, "tell me about a time when...", answered in the STAR order of situation, task, action and result (see competency-based pilot interviews). A scenario question asks for a hypothetical plan. A hypothetical invites the textbook answer, so panels tend to follow a scenario with complications ("the captain says no", "now you are short of fuel") until the candidate's real priorities show.

Panels use scenarios where the candidate may lack the experience to answer from memory: a cadet has never had to challenge a captain, and few pilots have met an incapacitation. They also test knowledge of rules and procedures at the same time as behavior.

Answer the question that was asked. If the panel asks what you would do, give the plan; a short real example can follow, but it does not replace the plan. If it asks for a time when, a hypothetical answer scores poorly.

What assessors look for

In airline training, EASA's AMC1 ORO.FC.115 bases CRM assessment on the principle that only observable behaviors are assessed. The NOTECHS framework in GM6 ORO.FC.115 groups them into four categories, cooperation, leadership and managerial skills, situation awareness and decision making, and gives example markers such as "concentrates on what is right rather than who is right", "intervenes if task completion deviates from standards", "states alternative courses of action" and "checks outcome against plan". Many airline frameworks build on the pilot competencies of ICAO Doc 9995 instead, but the idea is the same.

An interview panel can only hear words, so the behaviors have to be said aloud: what the candidate would say, to whom and when. Strong answers usually show:

• the aircraft flown and safety placed first;
• respect for the commander's authority alongside a clear duty to speak up;
• objective criteria rather than opinion: SOPs, the stabilized approach gate, minima, fuel figures;
• use of every resource, from the other pilot to the cabin crew, ATC and the company;
• a decision, a review of whether it is working, and a report afterward.

Weak answers freeze on authority ("it is the captain's decision"), jump straight to taking control, invent rules, or blame. Where an airline's own procedure is unknown, it is better to say so and answer from the operations manual and SOP principles.

A structure for scenario answers

A good answer follows the order a crew would follow:

1. Fly the aircraft. Aviate, navigate, communicate. In a time-critical event, the memory items and trained responses come first and the structured model afterward.
2. Verify the picture. Check the instruments and ask the other pilot: is the concern real?
3. Decide with a named model, aloud. FOR-DEC (facts, options, risks and benefits, decision, execution, check) and DODAR (diagnosis, options, decide, assign, review) are common in Europe, DECIDE in FAA training. For a non-urgent decision the captain hears the crew's views before stating his or her own.
4. Communicate and assign. The other pilot, then ATC, the cabin crew, the passengers and the company.
5. Review and report. Check that the decision is working, loop back if the situation changes, and file a report. EASA's CAT.GEN.MPA.100 requires crew members to report to the commander any incident that endangered, or could have endangered, the safety of the operation, and to comply with the operator's occurrence reporting schemes.

View full schematic

A model is a means, not the answer: the panel wants to hear the decision it produces (see aeronautical decision making).

Captain authority and assertiveness scenarios

The legal frame is short. Under CAT.GEN.MPA.105 the commander has authority to give all commands and take any appropriate actions to secure the safety of the aircraft and of the persons and property on board, and in an emergency that requires immediate decision and action may deviate from rules and procedures in the interest of safety. In the United States, 14 CFR 91.3 makes the pilot in command directly responsible for, and the final authority as to, the operation of the aircraft. Speaking up is part of the job too: AMC1 ORO.FC.115 calls for training the pilot monitoring on when and how to intervene, with reference to the operator's procedures for structured intervention.

The classic question, "your captain is making a wrong decision", is answered with graded assertiveness. Check your own perception first, then climb a ladder such as PACE (see flight deck leadership):

• Probe: "Captain, what speed are we planning at the 1,000 ft gate?"
• Alert: "We are 20 kt fast and above the profile."
• Challenge: "I am not happy: we will not be stable at 1,000 ft. I recommend a go-around."
• Emergency: the go-around call, or taking control if the danger is immediate.

The wording stays factual, puts the concern as an "I" statement and refers to objective criteria, so the captain hears a fact, not a judgment. Under most airline SOPs either pilot may call a go-around and the pilot flying complies. The two-challenge rule covers silence: if a pilot fails to respond to two clear challenges about a significant deviation, the other pilot assumes incapacitation and takes control. EASA human performance texts cite a CHIRP report in which a junior first officer received no responses to the approach checks, sat tight and let the captain carry on; the aircraft struck the ground short of the runway, and the captain had died during the approach.

Common variations test the same principles from other angles:

The alcohol question needs the rules. EASA's AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)(1) sets the least an operator's instructions should require: no alcohol less than 8 hours before reporting for duty, a blood alcohol level not above the lower of the national limit and 0.2 per mille at the start of the duty, and none during it. The FAA forbids crewmember duties within 8 hours of drinking, and its AIM recommends 12 to 24 hours. A question built on "drinking 10 hours before duty" is therefore not settled by the clock alone: the answer depends on the operator's own policy and on the pilot's fitness, and a crew member under the influence of alcohol may not perform duties at all (CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)). Strong answers also mention the confidential, non-punitive support program to which EASA operators must give their flight crew access under CAT.GEN.MPA.215 (see alcohol, drugs and medication).

Threat and error management scenarios

TEM gives scenario answers their vocabulary. A threat arises outside the crew's influence and must be managed; an error is the crew's own action or inaction; an undesired aircraft state is a crew-induced deviation that reduces the safety margin. The defenses are avoid, trap and mitigate.

A typical question: late at night, after a long duty, ATC gives a runway change on descent into a busy airport. A strong answer names the late change as an unexpected threat and the long day as a factor to brief, asks for time with vectors or a hold, re-briefs the new approach, cross-checks every change made in the flight management system, and sets the stabilization gate in advance. If the aircraft is still high and fast at the gate, that is an undesired aircraft state, and the answer is a go-around, not a debate about why the descent started late (see stabilized approach).

Other favorites follow the same pattern:

• Commercial pressure. Weather at destination near minima, a full flight and a tight schedule. Set the diversion criteria and fuel before descent; reaching them means diverting. Legality is the floor, not the target.
• Fatigue. Under CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c), a crew member who knows or suspects fatigue to the extent that the flight may be endangered may not perform duties. The answer is to report unfit through the operator's process, not to press on.
• Surprise and startle. EASA's CRM material calls for training in surprise and startle effects. The answer is to recognize the startle, fly the aircraft, run the memory items, then decide (see startle and surprise).
• Distraction. A minor fault during a hold or approach. One pilot flies and monitors; the other works the problem.

Case-study questions

Case studies are part of every phase of EASA operator CRM training: AMC1 ORO.FC.115 calls for accident and serious incident reviews that identify non-technical causes and lack of CRM, and for the analysis of occurrences that were well managed. Panels therefore expect candidates to know a few cases and to draw lessons from them.

A good case answer takes about a minute: the facts in two sentences, the chain of threats, errors and missed chances, the CRM lesson, what changed afterward, and what it means for the candidate's own flying. Accuracy matters more than detail, and a case that is not known well should not be offered. The core cases, summarized in human factors accident case studies, are:

• Eastern Air Lines 401 (1972): all three crew members absorbed in a nose gear indication while the TriStar descended unnoticed into the Everglades. Someone must always fly the aircraft.
• Tenerife (1977): the KLM 747 began its takeoff in fog without a takeoff clearance, after a non-standard readback and a blocked transmission; the flight engineer's question about the Pan Am 747 was dismissed. 583 people died. Communication and the authority gradient.
• United Airlines 173 (1978): the DC-8 ran out of fuel near Portland while the crew dealt with a landing gear indication; the other crew members mentioned the fuel state but never pressed it. Assertiveness; with Tenerife, it fed the 1979 NASA workshop that launched CRM.
• US Airways 1549 (2009): after a bird strike with loss of thrust in both engines, the captain took control and the first officer began the engine dual failure checklist; the A320 was ditched on the Hudson and all 155 on board survived. A case of crew coordination that worked.

Balance matters. A request for a case "where CRM worked" is better answered with United 232 or US Airways 1549 than with another accident, and a candidate who speaks of a dead crew with contempt rather than understanding loses more than the point. The aim, in every scenario and case, is to show the panel the colleague the candidate will be on the line.

Library articles are written for study and exam preparation. They do not replace your aircraft's approved documentation, your operator's procedures or the regulations themselves.